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1. Introduction
This study investigates the relation between accruals quality and the costs of debt and equity 
capital for a large sample of firms over the period 1970-2001.  Our study is motivated by recent 
theoretical research that shows that information risk is a non-diversifiable risk factor (e.g., Easley and 
O’Hara [2003]; O’Hara [2003]; Leuz and Verrecchia [2004]).  By information risk, we mean the 
likelihood that firm-specific information that is pertinent to investor pricing decisions is of poor quality.
We assume that cash flow is the primitive element that investors price and identify accruals quality as the 
measure of information risk associated with a key accounting number – earnings.  That is, accruals quality 
tells investors about the mapping of accounting earnings into cash flows.  Relatively poor accruals quality
weakens this mapping and, therefore, increases information risk.
1
Our paper makes two contributions.  First, consistent with theories that demonstrate a role for 
information risk in asset pricing, we show that firms with poor accruals quality have higher costs of 
capital than do firms with good accruals quality.  This result is consistent with the view that information 
risk (as proxied by accruals quality) is a priced risk factor.  Second, we attempt to disentangle whether the 
components of accruals quality – accruals that reflect economic fundamentals (‘innate factors’) and 
accruals that represent managerial choices (‘discretionary factors’) – have different cost of capital effects.
While theory does not distinguish among the sources of information risk, prior research on discretionary
accruals (e.g., Guay, Kothari and Watts [1996]; Subramanyam [1996]) provides a framework in which 
discretionary accruals quality and innate accruals quality will have distinct cost of capital effects.  Briefly,
1 We focus on accruals quality because we believe it is a more primitive construct for information risk concerning
cash flows than are other earnings attributes. Other studies that investigate alternative (to accruals quality) measures
include: Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper [2003], who calibrate the pricing effects of accruals quality,
persistence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, timeliness and conservatism; Barth and Landsman [2003],
who examine the relation between the value relevance of earnings and the weighted average cost of capital; Barone 
[2003], who examines measures based on Lev and Thiagarajan’s [1993] fundamental scores and a measure based on
relations between financial statement line items; and Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker [2003], who examine the
association between country-level measures of the average cost of equity and earnings opacity (where opacity is a 
combination of earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and earnings smoothing behavior, measured at the country
level).
1this body of work suggests that, in broad samples, discretionary accrual choices are likely to reflect both 
opportunism (which exacerbates information risk) and performance measurement (which mitigates
information risk); these conflicting effects will yield average cost of capital effects for discretionary
accruals quality that are likely lower than the cost of capital effects for innate accruals quality.  Consistent 
with this view, we find that innate accruals quality has larger cost of capital effects than does 
discretionary accruals quality.
The accruals quality (AQ) metric we use is based on Dechow and Dichev’s [2002] model which
posits a relation between current period working capital accruals and operating cash flows in the prior, 
current and future periods.  Following McNichols’ [2002] discussion of this model, we also include the 
change in revenues and property, plant and equipment (PPE) as additional explanatory variables.  In this 
framework, working capital accruals reflect managerial estimates of cash flows, and the extent to which 
those accruals do not map into cash flows, changes in revenues and PPE – due to intentional and
unintentional estimation errors – is an inverse measure of accruals quality.
Our tests examine the relation between AQ and the costs of debt and equity capital.  We find that
firms with poorer AQ have higher ratios of interest expense to interest-bearing debt and lower debt ratings 
than firms with better AQ (all differences significant at the 0.001 level).  Controlling for other variables
known to affect debt costs (leverage, firm size, return on assets, interest coverage, and earnings volatility),
the results suggest that firms with the best AQ enjoy a 126 basis point (bp) lower cost of debt relative to 
firms with the worst AQ.  In terms of the cost of equity, tests focusing on earnings-price ratios show that 
firms with lower AQ have significantly (at the 0.001 level) larger earnings-price ratios relative to their 
industry peers; that is, a dollar of earnings commands a lower price multiple when the quality of the 
accruals component of those earnings is low.  More direct tests show that CAPM betas increase 
monotonically across AQ quintiles, with a difference in betas between the lowest and highest quintiles of 
0.35 (significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level).  Assuming a 6% market risk premium, this 
difference implies a 210 bp higher cost of equity for firms with the worst AQ relative to firms with the 
best AQ.  In asset pricing regressions which include market returns and an accruals quality factor 
2(AQfactor), we find that not only is there a significant (at the 0.001 level) positive loading on AQfactor,
but the coefficient on the market risk premium (i.e., the estimated beta) decreases in magnitude by nearly
20%.  Extending this analysis to the three-factor asset pricing regression, we find that AQfactor adds 
significantly to size and book to market (as well as the market risk premium) in explaining variation in 
expected returns.  In these regressions, the largest change in coefficient estimates (relative to the model
which excludes AQfactor) is noted for the size factor where the average loading declines by about 30%
when AQfactor is included.  We conclude that accruals quality not only influences the loadings on 
documented risk factors, but contributes significant incremental explanatory power over and above these 
factors.
We extend these analyses by investigating whether the pricing of accruals quality differs 
depending on whether the source of accruals quality is innate, that is, driven by the firm’s business model
and operating environment, or discretionary, that is, subject to management interventions.  Following
Dechow and Dichev, we identify several summary indicators of the firm’s operating environment or 
business model: firm size, standard deviation of cash flows, standard deviation of revenues, length of
operating cycle, and frequency of negative earnings realizations.  Our first analysis uses the fitted values 
from annual regressions of AQ on these summary indicators as the measure of the innate portion of 
accrual quality; the residual is used as the measure of discretionary accruals quality.  Our second analysis
of innate versus discretionary components includes these summary indicators as additional control
variables in the cost of capital tests.  Controlling for these variables allows us to interpret the coefficient
on (total) AQ as capturing the pricing effects associated with the discretionary piece of accruals quality –
that is, the piece that is incremental to the innate factors.  Regardless of the approach used to isolate the 
components of AQ, we find that the cost of capital effect of a unit of discretionary AQ is smaller both in
magnitude and statistical significance than the cost of capital effect of a unit of innate AQ.
Overall, we interpret our results as documenting cost of capital effects that are consistent with a 
rational asset pricing framework in which accruals quality captures an information risk factor that cannot 
be diversified away.  The findings concerning innate and discretionary accruals quality are consistent with 
3information risk having larger pricing effects when it is driven by firm-specific operating and 
environmental characteristics than when it is associated with discretionary decisions.
We believe these results have implications for assessments of reporting quality.  First, we provide 
systematic evidence that reporting quality as captured by accruals quality is salient for investors; that is, 
we provide evidence that reporting quality matters. Second, our results contradict an implicit assumption
in some policy-oriented discussions (e.g., Levitt [1998]) that reporting quality is largely determined by
management’s short-term reporting choices; our results suggest that in broad samples, over long periods,
reporting quality is substantially more affected by management’s long-term strategic decisions that affect 
intrinsic factors.  For those who believe that financial reporting should reflect economic conditions more
than management implementation decisions, this result suggests that accrual accounting is performing as 
intended.  Third, research which has assessed the relative importance of reporting standards versus 
implementation decisions using a cross-jurisdictional design (e.g., Ball, Robin and Wu [2003]) has 
concluded that the reporting standards are less important than the incentives which drive implementation
decisions in determining differences in earnings quality across jurisdictions.  Our results suggest that this 
analysis should be further conditioned on innate factors that capture jurisdiction-specific features of 
business models and operating environments.
In addition to research pertaining to the pricing of information risk, our results relate to three 
other streams of research.  The first stream investigates the capital market effects of financial reporting, as 
documented by adverse capital market consequences (in the form of shareholder losses) when earnings
are of such low quality as to attract regulatory or legal attention.  For example, previous research has 
documented severe economic consequences for earnings of sufficiently low quality as to attract SEC 
enforcement actions (Feroz, Park and Pastena [1991]; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney [1996]; Beneish 
[1999]), shareholder lawsuits (Kellogg [1984]; Francis, Philbrick and Schipper [1994]), or restatements 
(Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz [2001]).  The financial press also provides ample anecdotal evidence 
of catastrophic shareholder losses associated with the (arguably) lowest quality accruals, those resulting 
from financial fraud.  However, research on severely low earnings quality firms does not establish a 
4general relation between reporting quality and capital market consequences.  Our results show that the 
quality of one component of earnings – accruals – has economically meaningful consequences for broad 
samples of firms, unconditional on external indicators of extremely poor quality.
The second stream of related research explores a different, and explicitly anomalous, form of 
capital market effects of accruals.  By anomalous effects we mean systematic patterns in average returns 
not explained by the CAPM (Fama and French [1996]).  Specifically, this research shows that firms with 
relatively (high) low magnitudes of signed accruals, or signed abnormal accruals, earn (negative) positive 
risk-adjusted returns (e.g., Sloan [1996]; Xie [2001]; Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok [2001]).
While both anomaly research and our investigation are concerned with the relation between accruals-
based measures and returns, the perspectives differ.  Whereas anomaly research views the abnormal 
returns associated with observable firm attributes as arising from slow or biased investor responses to 
information, we view observable firm characteristics as proxies for underlying, priced risk factors.
Consistent with this view, our tests are based on unsigned measures.  That is, we predict that larger 
magnitudes of AQ are associated with larger required returns, regardless of the sign of accruals, because a 
larger magnitude of AQ indicates greater information risk, for which investors require compensation in 
the form of larger expected returns.  In contrast, anomaly research rests on signed accruals measures; this
research predicts positive returns to firms with the largest negative accruals and negative returns to firms
with the largest positive accruals.  While the anomaly research perspective and our perspective imply the 
same predictions about large negative accruals, the perspectives imply the opposite predictions for large 
positive accruals.  Consistent with this argument, we find that while the profitability of the accruals 
trading strategy is marginally reduced by the inclusion of accruals quality as a control (risk) factor, the 
abnormal returns remain reliably positive.  We conclude that the accruals quality pricing effects that we 
document are distinct from the accruals anomaly.
The third stream of related research assesses the relation between costs of capital and measures of 
either the quantity of information communicated to investors, or some mixture of quality/quantity
attributes of that information.  For example, Botosan [1997] finds evidence of higher costs of equity for 
5firms with low analyst following and relatively low disclosure scores, where the scores capture
information quantity.  Research has also found a relation between both the cost of equity (Botosan and 
Plumlee [2002]) and the cost of debt (Sengupta [1998]) and analyst-based (AIMR) evaluations of 
aggregate disclosure efforts, where the evaluations take into account annual and quarterly reports, proxy
statements, other published information and direct communications to analysts.  Our analysis adds to this 
work by providing evidence on the link between the costs of debt and equity capital and measures of the 
quality of accruals information.
In the next section we develop hypotheses and describe the proxy for accruals quality used to test
these hypotheses.  Section 3 describes the sample and provides descriptive information on the test and 
control variables.  Section 4 reports tests of whether (total) accruals quality is related to the cost of capital 
and section 5 extends these tests by examining whether the innate and discretionary components of 
accruals quality are separately and differentially priced.  Section 6 reports the results of robustness checks 
and additional tests.  Section 7 concludes. 
2. Hypotheses and Accruals Quality Metrics
2.1.  Theories of the pricing of information risk
Our paper builds on theoretical research investigating how the supply of information affects the 
cost of capital.  Easley and O’Hara [2003] develop a multi-asset rational expectations model in which the 
private versus public composition of information affects required returns and thus the cost of capital.  In 
their model, relatively more private information increases uninformed investors’ risk of holding the stock, 
because the privately informed investors are better able to shift their portfolio weights to take advantage
of new information.  Uninformed investors thus face a form of systematic (i.e., undiversifiable) 
information risk, and will require higher returns (charge a higher cost of capital) as compensation.
Required returns are affected both by the amount of private information (with more private information
increasing required returns) and by the precision of public and private information (with greater precision 
of either reducing required returns).  Easley and O’Hara explicitly note an important role for precise
6accounting information in reducing the cost of capital by decreasing the (information-based) systematic
risk of shares to uninformed investors.
Taking a different approach, Leuz and Verrecchia [2004] consider the role of performance reports 
(e.g., earnings) in aligning firms and investors with respect to capital investments.  Poor quality reporting 
impairs the coordination between firms and their investors with respect to the firm’s capital investment
decisions, and thereby creates information risk. Anticipating this, investors demand a higher risk
premium; that is, they charge a higher cost of capital.  Leuz and Verrecchia show that even in an economy 
with many firms and a systematic component to the payoff, a portion of this information risk is non-
diversifiable.
In short, both Easley and O’Hara and Leuz and Verrecchia predict that firms with more
information risk will have higher costs of capital.  In both models, information risk concerns the 
uncertainty or imprecision of information used or desired by investors to price securities.  We assume that 
investors value securities based on their assessments of future cash flows; therefore, we seek a measure
that captures the information uncertainty in cash flows.  Information about cash flows is supplied by
earnings; that is, cash flow equals earnings less accruals, and prior research (e.g., Dechow [1994]) shows 
that current earnings is, on average, a good indicator of future cash flow.  We focus on the accrual 
component of earnings because this component is subject to greater uncertainty than is the cash flow 
component. Accruals are the product of judgments, estimates, and allocations (of cash flow events in 
other periods), while the cash flow component of income is realized.  Using accruals quality as the proxy 
for information risk, we formalize the prediction that costs of capital are increasing in information risk; 
stated in null form, our first hypothesis is: 
H1: There is no difference in the costs of capital of firms with poor accruals quality and firms
with good accruals quality.
7We test this hypothesis against the alternative that firms with poor accruals quality have higher costs of 
capital than firms with good accruals quality.
2
2.2.  Measuring accruals quality
We believe that uncertainty in accruals is best captured by the measure of accruals quality
developed by Dechow and Dichev [2002] (hereafter DD).  In the DD model, accruals quality is measured
by the extent to which working capital accruals map into operating cash flow realizations.  This model is 
predicated on the idea that, regardless of management intent, accruals quality is affected by the 
measurement error in accruals.  Intentional estimation error arises from incentives to manage earnings,
and unintentional error arises from management lapses and environmental uncertainty; however, the 
source of the error is irrelevant in this approach.  DD’s approach regresses working capital accruals on 
cash from operations in the current period, prior period and future period.  The unexplained portion of the
variation in working capital accruals is an inverse measure of accruals quality (a greater unexplained 
portion implies poorer quality).
As a practical matter, the DD approach is limited to current accruals.  While applying the DD 
model to total accruals would, in principle, produce an accruals quality metric that comprehensively
measures accruals uncertainty, the long lags between non-current accruals and cash flow realizations 
effectively preclude this extension.  To address this limitation, we also consider proxies for accruals 
quality that are based on the absolute value of abnormal accruals, where abnormal accruals are estimated
using the Jones [1991] model, as modified by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney [1995].  Applying the 
modified Jones approach to our setting, accruals quality is related to the extent to which accruals are well 
captured by fitted values obtained by regressing total accruals on changes in revenues and plant, plant and 
equipment.  Because abnormal accruals consider both current and non-current accruals they do not suffer 
from the limitation of the DD model.  However, the modified Jones’ model’s identification of ‘abnormal’
2 Easley, Hvidkjær and O’Hara [2002] find results that are broadly consistent with the prediction that firms with
more private information (as measured by PIN scores, a market microstructure measure of informed trading) and 
less public information have larger expected excess returns.  Our analysis complements their research by
considering a second implication of Easley and O’Hara’s model, namely, that more precise (higher quality)
accounting information reduces the cost of capital.
8accruals has been subject to much criticism (see, for example, Guay, Kothari and Watts [1996]; Bernard 
and Skinner [1996]).  Furthermore, the modified Jones model identifies accruals as abnormal if they are 
not explained by a limited set of fundamentals (PPE and changes in revenues), and while we believe that 
such abnormal accruals contain a substantial amount of uncertainty, the link to information risk is less 
direct than in the DD approach.
For these reasons, we use the DD approach to estimate a proxy for accruals quality.  (As 
described in section 6.1, we also examine the sensitivity of our results to other AQ measures.)
Specifically, our AQ metric is based on the cross-sectional DD model, augmented with the fundamental 
variables from the modified Jones model, namely, PPE and change in revenues (all variables are scaled by
average assets):
t j t j j t j j t j j t j j t j j j t j PPE Rev CFO CFO CFO TCA , , , 5 , , 4 1 , , 3 , , 2 1 , , 1 , 0 , X I I I I I I   '          (1) 
where t j t j t j t j t j STDEBT Cash CL CA TCA , , , , , '  '  '  '    = total current accruals in year t, 
t j t j t j TA NIBE CFO , , ,    = firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t,
3
t j NIBE , = firm j’s net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) in year t, 
= t j TA , ,, , , () , j tj t j t j t CA CL Cash STDEBT DEPN ' ' '  '  jt = firm j’s total accruals in year t
t j CA , '  = firm j’s change in current assets (Compustat #4) between year t-1 and year t, 
t j CL , '  = firm j’s change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) between year t-1 and year t,
t j Cash , '  = firm j’s change in cash (Compustat #1) between year t-1 and year t,
t j STDEBT , '  =  firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat #34) between year t-1 
and year t,
t j DEPN ,  = firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) in year t,
, jt Rev ' = firm j’s change in revenues (Compustat #12) between year t-1 and year t, 
t j PPE , = firm j’s gross value of property, plant and equipment (Compustat #7) in year t, 
McNichols [2002] proposes this combined model, arguing that the change in sales revenue and
PPE are important in forming expectations about current accruals, over and above the effects of operating 
3 We calculate total accruals using information from the balance sheet and income statement (indirect approach). We
use the indirect approach rather than the statement of cash flows (or direct method, advocated by Hribar and Collins
[2002]) because statement of cash flow data are not available prior to 1988 (the effective year of SFAS No. 95) and
our AQ metric requires five yearly observations. We draw similar inferences (not reported) if we restrict our sample
to post-1987 and use data from the statement of cash flows.
9cash flows.  She shows that adding these variables to the cross-sectional DD regression significantly
increases its explanatory power, thus reducing measurement error.  Our intent in using this modified DD 
model is to obtain a better-specified expectations model which, in turn, should lead to a better-specified 
stream of residuals.  For our sample, the addition of change in revenues and PPE increases explanatory
power from a mean of 39% to a mean of 50%.
We estimate equation (1) for each of Fama and French’s [1997] 48 industry groups with at least 
20 firms in year t.  Consistent with the prior literature, we winsorize the extreme values of the distribution 
to the 1 and 99 percentiles.  Annual cross-sectional estimations of (1) yield firm- and year-specific
residuals, which form the basis for our accruals quality metric: , () j t AQ jt VX    is the standard deviation of 
firm j’s residuals,  , j t X , calculated over years t-4 through t.  Larger standard deviations of residuals 
indicate poorer accruals quality.  However, if a firm has consistently large residuals, so that the standard 
deviation of those residuals is small, that firm has relatively good accruals quality because there is little 
uncertainty about its accruals.  For such a firm, the accruals map poorly into cash flows, but this is a 
predictable phenomenon, and should not be a reason for priced uncertainty.
2.3.  Distinguishing between the cost of capital effects of innate and discretionary accruals quality
 2.3.1 Hypothesis development. The theoretical models summarized in section 2.1 establish a 
pricing role for information risk, but do not distinguish among possible sources of this risk.  That is, these 
models do not predict differences between the pricing effects of poor accruals quality that is driven by 
innate features of the firm’s business model and operating environment, and poor accruals quality that is 
discretionary, i.e., due to accounting choices, implementation decisions, and managerial error.  However, 
insights from research on earnings management suggest a potential distinction between the pricing effects 
of the innate and discretionary components of accruals quality.  Guay, Kothari and Watts’ [1996]
discussion of the exercise of managerial discretion over accruals suggests that the discretionary
component of accruals quality contains up to three distinct subcomponents.  The performance
subcomponent, which reflects management’s attempts to enhance the ability of earnings to reflect
10performance in a reliable and timely way, would be expected to reduce information risk.  The second and 
third subcomponents, which reflect opportunism and pure noise, respectively, would be expected to 
increase information risk, although it is not clear that they would have the same magnitude of effect as 
would innate accruals quality.
While Guay et al.’s arguments suggest that the performance and opportunism subcomponents
dominate the noise component (that is, the discretionary component of accruals is not mostly noise), their 
empirical results do not clearly point to either the performance effect or the opportunistic effect as being 
empirically stronger for the sample they consider. However, their discussion of results, combined with 
Healy’s [1996] discussion of their paper, provides insights that are pertinent for our purposes.  First, Guay 
et al., p.104, conclude that “[g]iven that managerial discretion over accruals has survived for centuries, 
our prior is that the net effect of discretionary accruals in the population is to enhance earnings as a 
performance indicator.”
 4  Under this view, the discretionary component of accruals quality reduces
information risk, and thereby offsets the increased cost of capital associated with low innate accruals
quality.
However, Guay et al. also note, as does Healy, that broad samples covering long time periods will 
contain both accruals that conform to the performance hypothesis and accruals that are driven by
managerial opportunism. Specifically, Healy notes that in a cross-section of firms, management of one 
firm can report opportunistically and management of another can report unbiasedly (with both behaviors 
potentially shifting over time), with the result that the overall observed effect, for a given sample, will be 
a weighted average of the separate effects.  That is, while performance effects might be expected to 
dominate when management does not face incentives to engage in opportunistic behaviors, previous
research provides evidence that opportunistic effects dominate in carefully-selected, nonrandom samples
4 Empirical support for the view that, in large samples, discretionary accruals improve earnings as a signal of 
performance is provided by Subramanyam [1996], who finds that managerial discretion improves the
contemporaneous returns-earnings relation.  Note, however, that returns-earnings (or value-relevance) tests of the
pricing of accruals are fundamentally different from our cost of capital tests.  The latter focus on future expected 
returns and unsigned measures of accruals quality, while the former focus on contemporaneous realized returns and
signed measures of accruals (total or discretionary).
11where incentives for opportunistic behaviors are strong.  Our sample, which is selected to enhance the 
generalizability of our results, likely contains observations that are associated with both effects.  We do 
not attempt to separate these effects because testing for opportunistic behaviors affecting discretionary 
accruals quality would require the use of targeted, idiosyncratic samples chosen to enhance the effects of 
specific incentives to behave opportunistically.
Placing these results and discussion in the context of our research question, we draw the 
following inferences.  First, while theories of information risk do not imply differences in the cost of 
capital effects of innate versus discretionary accruals quality, research on earnings management and
discretionary accruals suggests the possibility of such differences. Second, managers’ attempts to use 
discretion over accruals to improve earnings as a performance indicator will reduce the information 
asymmetry that gives rise to undiversifiable information risk, and therefore reduce the information risk 
premium demanded by investors.  However, broad samples covering long time periods will also contain 
observations where managerial discretion is used to reap opportunistic gains; such behaviors are expected 
to increase information uncertainty and, therefore, increase the risk premium demanded by investors.
This reasoning implies that discretionary accruals quality is expected to have cost of capital effects that 
reflect some mixture of performance improvement (which will offset the cost of capital increases 
associated with innate accruals quality factors) and opportunism plus noise (which will exacerbate these 
factors).  To the extent that discretionary accruals quality reflects a mixture of information-risk-increasing 
and information-risk-decreasing effects, we expect the overall cost of capital effect to be smaller than the 
effect for innate accruals quality.  Our second hypothesis formalizes the prediction of differential cost of 
capital effects between innate and discretionary components of accruals quality; we state H2 in its null 
form (which implies that investors are indifferent to the specific causes of information risk) and test it 
against the alternative form (which implies that investors value a unit of discretionary accruals quality
less than they value a unit of innate accruals quality):
H2:  There is no difference in the cost of capital effects of the innate component of accruals 
quality versus the discretionary component of accruals quality.
122.3.2 Empirical distinctions between innate and discretionary accruals quality. We use two 
approaches to disentangle the costs of capital effects of the discretionary and innate components of 
accruals quality.  Both methods use summary indicators to capture the influence of operating environment
and business model on accruals quality.  We refer to these effects as ‘innate factors,’ recognizing that this 
description is imprecise because management can change the business model (e.g., by increasing 
receivables turnover) or the operating environment (e.g., by exiting a line of business or a geographic 
region).  We view innate factors as being slow to change, relative to factors (such as management’s
accounting implementation decisions) that affect discretionary accruals quality.  We use the factors 
suggested by DD as affecting (innate) accruals quality: firm size, standard deviation of cash flow from
operations, standard deviation of sales revenues, length of operating cycle and incidence of negative 
earnings realizations.
The first approach (Method 1) explicitly separates the innate and discretionary components of 
accruals quality using annual regressions of AQ on the innate factors.  The predicted value from each
regression yields an estimate of the innate portion of firm j’s accrual quality in year t, , j t InnateAQ .  The 
prediction error is the estimate of the discretionary component of the firm’s accruals quality in year
t, , j t DiscAQ .  Method 1 replaces the (total) AQ variable in the original regressions with InnateAQ and 
DiscAQ.  The second approach (Method 2) controls for innate factors affecting accruals quality by
including them as independent variables in the costs of capital tests.  In these augmented regressions, the 
coefficient on AQ captures the cost of capital effect of the portion of accruals quality that is incremental
to the effect captured by the innate factors.  We interpret this coefficient as a measure of the cost of 
capital effect of discretionary accruals quality.
The two approaches to distinguishing between innate and discretionary accruals quality differ in
several ways that have implications for drawing inferences about H2.  One difference arises because 
Method 2 does not produce a separate measure of innate accruals quality.  Therefore, under the Method 2 
approach, inferences about H2, which (in its null form) predicts no differences in the costs of capital 
13effects of innate versus discretionary accruals quality, must be based on comparisons between the total 
accruals quality cost of capital effect and the discretionary component’s effect.  In contrast, Method 1 
allows us to make direct comparisons of the effects of innate versus discretionary accruals quality.  A 
second difference stems from the relative sensitivity of the two methods to the effects of potentially
omitted innate variables, Z.  Under Method 1, omitted innate factors lead to model misspecification,
which manifests itself as noise in the error term.  All else equal, noisier values of the error terms increase 
the measurement error in DiscAQ, leading to a downward bias (toward zero) on the estimates of the 
pricing effects of discretionary accruals quality.  Under Method 2, the exclusion of Z likely results in 
larger coefficient estimates on AQ than would occur if Z is included as an independent variable 
(assuming that Z is positively associated with the cost of capital).  In short, to the extent our set of innate 
factors is incomplete, the estimated pricing effects of discretionary accruals quality are likely biased 
downward under Method 1 and upward under Method 2.  Comparing results based on the two methods
bounds the cost of capital effects of the discretionary component of accruals quality, conditional on the 
identification of the set of innate factors. 
3. Sample and Description of Accruals Quality Proxies 
We calculate values of , () j t AQ jt VX   for all firms with available data for the 32-year period 
t=1970-2001.  To be included in any of the market-based tests, we require that each firm-year observation 
have data on AQ and the necessary market measures.  Because  () j t VX is based on five annual residuals, 
our sample is restricted to firms with at least five years of data.  This restriction likely biases our sample
to surviving firms which tend to be larger and more successful than the population.  We expect this 
restriction will, if anything, reduce the variation in AQ, making it more difficult to detect effects.  In total, 
there are 91,280 firm-year observations with data on AQ.  The number of firms each year ranges from
about 1,500 per year in the early 1970s to roughly 3,500 per year towards the end of the sample period.
Table 1 reports summary statistics on AQ for the pooled sample. Mean and median values of AQ are 
140.0442 and 0.0313, respectively; 80% of the values are in the range from 0.0107 to 0.0943.  In unreported 
tests, we also examine the over-time variation in AQ, as captured by the cross-sectional distribution of
firm j’s rolling five-year standard deviation of  () j t VX .  (We exclude firm-year observations with 
incomplete five-year data).  These data indicate considerable over-time variability, as evidenced by an 
average standard deviation of 0.0119, or 27% of the mean value of  ( ) 0.0442. jt VX  
Table 1 also reports summary information on selected financial variables.  The sample firms are
large (median market value of equity is about $64 million and median assets are about $102 million);
profitable (median return on assets is about 0.042); and growing (median sales growth is 0.126).  In 
unreported tests, we compare these sample attributes to those of the Compustat population for the same
time period.  Consistent with the selection bias noted above, our sample firms are larger, more profitable 
and experience higher growth than the typical Compustat firm (the median Compustat firm over our 
sample period has a market value of equity of $59 million, ROA of 0.034, and sales growth of 0.100).  We 
note that while the differences between our sample and the Compustat population are statistically
significant (tests not reported), they are relatively small in economic terms.
4. Accruals Quality and the Costs of Debt and Equity Capital 
Our first set of tests examines the association between accruals quality and proxies for costs of 
capital: cost of debt (section 4.1) and cost of equity, as captured by industry-adjusted earnings-price ratios 
(section 4.2) and factor loadings in conventional one-factor and three-factor asset pricing models (section 
4.3).  For each test, we merge the sample described in section 3 with all observations with the market and 
accounting data dictated by that test.  Of the 91,280 firm-year observations with data on AQ, 76,195 have 
data on interest expense as a percent of interest bearing debt (our proxy for the cost of debt) and 55,092
have the necessary data to calculate earnings-price ratios.  The samples used in the asset pricing tests 
include 8,881 firms with data on AQ and monthly returns data, and 20,878 firms with monthly returns 
data, respectively.
15Our analyses are based on annual regressions estimated using the decile ranks of AQ, for the 
period t=1970-2001.  The use of decile ranks controls for outliers and non-linearities, and facilitates 
interpretation of the economic magnitudes of the cost of capital effects.  To control for cross-sectional 
correlations, we assess the significance of the 32 annual regression results using the time-series standard 
errors of the estimated coefficients (Fama-MacBeth [1973]).
4.1. Cost of debt
Our first test examines whether AQ explains variation in the realized cost of debt (CostDebt),
calculated as the ratio of firm j’s interest expense in year t +1 (Compustat #15) to average interest bearing 
debt outstanding during years t and t +1 (Compustat #9 and #34). Summary information reported in 
Table 1 shows a mean (median) cost of debt of 9.9% (9.2%), with 80% of the sample having a cost of 
debt between 5.9% and 14.4%.
Evidence on the relation between CostDebtand accruals quality is detailed in Panel A of Table 
2, where we report the mean cost of debt for each quintile of the ranked AQ distribution.  These data show 
that the worst accruals quality firms (Q5) have mean cost of debt of 10.77% while the best accruals
quality firms (Q1) have mean cost of debt of 8.98%.  The increase in CostDebt across the quintiles is 
monotonic, with a significant (at the 0.001 level) difference between the mean  for the worst 
and best AQ quintile (Q5 versus Q1).  These differences are economically meaningful: the differential 
cost of debt between Q5 and Q1 corresponds to 179 bp (t-statistic = 10.10).
CostDebt
These effects may be overstated because the tests do not control for the effects of other factors 
known to affect the cost of debt: financial leverage, firm size, return on assets, interest coverage, and 
earnings volatility (Kaplan and Urwitz [1979]; Palepu, Healy and Bernard [2000]).  If accruals quality is 
not subsumed by one or more of these factors, and if creditors view firms with low quality accruals as 
riskier than firms with high quality accruals, we expect a positive relation between costs of debt and AQ,
or 6 0 T ! , in the following regression: 
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where = firm j’s ratio of interest-bearing debt to total assets in year t,  , jt Leverage
, jt Size = log of firm j’s total assets in year t, 
, jt ROA = firm j’s return on assets in year t, 
, jt IntCov = firm j’s ratio of operating income to interest expense in year t, 
, () jt NIBE V = standard deviation of firm j’s net income before extraordinary items (NIBE), scaled
by average assets, over the rolling prior 10- year period; we require at least five 
observations of NIBE to calculate the standard deviation.
Panel B, Table 2 reports the results of estimating equation (2). The first five rows show the 
coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the control variables.  As expected, earnings volatility is
significantly (at the 0.01 level or better) positively correlated withCostDebt, and ROA and IntCov are 
significantly (at the 0.01 level) negatively related; for our sample, CostDebt is insignificantly related to 
Size, and negatively related to Leverage.
5  The results for AQ show that accruals quality is positively
correlated withCostDebt (t-statistic = 13.36).  The mean value of the yearly 6 T ’s from the decile rank 
regressions indicates the economic importance of these effects.  The average coefficient estimate of 0.14, 
suggests a difference of 126 bp (0.14 multiplied by nine decile differences) in realized costs of debt 
between the worst and best AQ deciles.
In unreported tests, we also examine the association between accruals quality and ex-ante costs of 
debt, proxied by S&P Issuer Credit Ratings (Compustat #280).
6  The sample size for these tests is smaller
(n=13,032 firm-year observations) both because these data are available beginning in 1985 and because 
they are not reported for many firms.  Consistent with the results for the realized cost of debt, we find that 
AQ adds meaningfully to explaining debt ratings, incremental to control variables.  Specifically, the mean
5 The negative coefficient on Leverage suggests the possibility that firms with little debt in their capital structures
are minimally-levered because they face a high cost of debt.  To explore this possibility, we re-estimate (2) after
excluding firms with low debt financing (defined as firms with debt less than 20% of assets).  Results (not reported)
show that the coefficient on Leverage becomes significantly (at the 0.01 level) positive, and does not affect 
inferences about other variables.
6 We recode the Compustat data to remove unassigned and similar codes. Our recoded variable, DebtRating, ranges 
from 1 (AAA) to 20 (Default).
17decile rank coefficient estimate on AQ of 0.27 (t-statistic = 12.64) suggests a difference in debt ratings of 
2.43 for firms in the best and worst AQ deciles.  Given that the mean debt rating for firms in the best AQ
decile is roughly A, a 2.4 category difference corresponds to a BBB rating for the worst AQ firms. 
In summary, the above findings indicate that accruals quality affects the cost of debt, incremental
to financial leverage, size, return on assets, interest coverage and earnings volatility.  The results are 
consistent across both ex post and ex ante measures of the cost of debt.  The realized cost of debt 
regressions suggest a 126 basis point differential between the best and worst accruals quality firms.
4.2 Earnings-price ratios
Following Liu, Nissim and Thomas [2002], we view the price multiple attached to earnings as a 
short-hand valuation, which places a price on a dollar of earnings. A higher multiple implies a lower cost 
of capital—investors are willing to pay more for a given dollar of earnings.  Viewing the price-earnings
ratio as an inverse indicator of the cost of equity, we assess whether lower accruals quality results in 
lower price-earnings ratios (Penman [2001]). Specifically, we investigate the relation between AQ and 
industry-adjusted earnings-price ratios.  We use earnings-price ratios to address concerns with the effects 
of small values of earnings in the denominator, and we industry-adjust based on Alford’s [1992] finding 
that industry membership works well for selecting firms that are comparable in terms of risk and growth.
To calculate industry-adjusted EP ratios, we first calculate the median EP ratio for all firms with 
positive earnings in year t in each of the 48 Fama-French industry groups; we require a minimum of five 
positive earnings firms in the industry in year t (excluding firm j).  We calculate firm j’s industry-adjusted
EP ratio, IndEP, as the difference between its EP ratio and the median industry EP ratio in year t.  (We 
draw similar inferences using the ratio of firm j’s EP to the median industry EP.)  If investors apply lower
multiples to lower quality accruals, we expect the earnings associated with such accruals to have larger 
IndEP values.  Evidence on the relation between IndEP and AQ is provided in Panel A, Table 2, where 
we report the mean value of IndEP for each quintile of the ranked AQ distribution.  These data show that 
the poorest accruals quality firms have the largest IndEP, that the increase in IndEP is near monotonic
across AQ quintiles, and that the mean IndEP for the worst accruals quality quintile (Q5) is significantly
18larger than the mean for the best accruals quality quintile (Q1).  The difference in mean values between 
Q5 and Q1 is 0.0093 and is reliably different from zero (t-statistic = 4.37).  To provide a more intuitive
sense of the economic magnitude of this effect, we also calculated the difference in unadjusted price-
earnings earnings ratios between the worst and best AQ quintiles (tests not reported): the mean difference 
is about 12 (t-statistic = 7.96).  Given that the average EPS of our sample is $1.67, this difference in 
price-earnings ratios corresponds to about $20 per share of market value.
More formal tests of whether accruals quality explains industry-adjusted EP ratios are shown in 
Panel C, Table 2, where we report the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from estimating equation (3),
which includes controls for growth, leverage, beta and firm size:
,0 1 ,2 , 3 ,4 , 5, , j tj t j t j t j t IndEP Growth Leverage Beta Size AQjt jt -- - - - -        9       (3) 
where Growth = log of one plus the firm’s growth in book value of equity over the past five years,
Beta = 5-year rolling estimate of beta, obtained from firm-specific CAPM estimations; we require 
a firm to have at least 18 monthly returns for this estimation.
Results show that IndEP is negatively related to Growth (t-statistic = -2.00), consistent with 
higher growth firms having smaller earnings-price ratios.  We also expect that riskier firms have larger 
earnings-price ratios; this positive association is observed for Leverage (t-statistic = 2.55) but not for Beta
(where we find a reliably negative association).  To the extent that smaller firms are more risky than 
larger firms, our finding of a negative association between IndEP and Size (t-statistic = -1.67) is also 
consistent with the risk explanation.  The last row of Panel C shows that firms with larger AQ scores have 
larger earnings-price ratios, controlling for other factors affecting earnings-price ratios: the mean estimate
of 5 M  is positive, with a t-statistic of 5.83. We interpret this result as indicating that as the quality of 
accruals decreases, so too does the amount investors are willing to pay for a dollar of earnings, implying a 
higher cost of equity capital for firms with lower quality accruals. 
4.3  Factor loadings in one-factor and three-factor asset pricing models
Our next analysis investigates the effects of accruals quality on the equity cost of capital, as 
manifest in the factor loadings and explanatory power of one-factor and three-factor asset pricing models.
19Whereas the EP ratio analysis in the prior section captures investors’ ex-ante assessment of the cost of 
equity, the asset-pricing regressions in this section use average (ex-post) returns realizations to proxy for 
the cost of equity.  We begin by examining whether poorer accruals quality is associated with a larger 
factor loading on systematic risk (beta) in a traditional one-factor model.  If accruals quality is associated
with this risk, we expect a positive association between AQ and beta.
To allow for differences in firms’ fiscal year ends as well as over-time changes in accruals 
quality, we use a dynamic portfolio technique to assign firms to AQ quintiles.  Specifically, beginning in 
April 1971, we form quintiles on the first day of each calendar month m based on the firm’s most recent 
value of AQ known prior to month m; firms with the smallest (largest) AQ values are placed in the first 
(fifth) quintile.
7  We calculate the average monthly excess return for each quintile for the period April 
1971 to March 2002, yielding a time series of 384 monthly excess returns for each of the quintiles
(q=Q1,…,Q5).  The portfolio beta is the coefficient obtained from regressing each quintile’s monthly
excess return on the monthly excess market return: 
,, ,, () qm Fm q q Mm Fm qm RR R R , DE      H      ( 4 )
Panel A, Table 2 reports the betas obtained from estimating equation (4) for each quintile.  These 
data show that estimated betas increase monotonically across the quintiles, from 0.92 for Q1 to 1.27 for 
Q5.  The differences in betas between the Q5 and Q1 portfolios is 0.35 (t-statistic = 6.75).  Assuming a 
6% market risk premium, the Q5-Q1 difference in betas of 0.35 implies that firms with the highest quality
accruals enjoy a 210 basis point reduction in the cost of equity capital relative to firms with the worst 
quality accruals. 
More explicit tests of the effects of accruals quality on the cost of equity capital are conducted 
using firm-specific asset-pricing regressions.  We begin by estimating one-factor models for each of the 
J=8,881 firms with data on AQ and at least 18 monthly returns between April 1971 and March 2002.  The 
7 For example, for the month of April 1998 firms are ranked into quintiles based on the AQ signals calculated using 
annual data for fiscal year-ends between January 1997 and December 1997.  This procedure means that firm j’s AQ
signals for year t, where fiscal year t ends in month n, will influence firm j’s ranking for months n+4 through n+15.
20mean (median) sample firm has 159 (130) monthly returns.  Panel A, Table 3 reports the mean values of 
the coefficients and adjusted R
2’s from these CAPM tests, and reports t-statistics of whether the mean
coefficient estimate equals zero.  The results show a mean beta of 1.04 (t-statistic of 174.57) and a mean
adjusted R
2 of 13.5%.  To the traditional CAPM, we add a variable capturing accruals quality.
Specifically, we calculate an AQ factor-mimicking portfolio, AQfactor, equal to the difference between 
the monthly excess returns of the top two AQ quintiles (Q4 and Q5) and the bottom two AQ quintiles (Q1 
and Q2).  This procedure (similar to that used by Fama and French [1993] to construct size and book-to-
market factor-mimicking portfolios) yields a series of 384 monthly AQfactor returns.  Panel A shows the 
results of regressions which include AQfactor as an additional independent variable; these tests allow us 
to assess the degree to which accruals quality overlaps with and adds to the market risk premium in 
explaining returns.  Specifically, we report the mean of the J=8,881 loadings, j E  and j O , from firm-
specific estimations of equation (5): 
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The mean loading on AQfactor is positive and highly statistically significant, with a t-statistic of 
83.48.  The mean estimated beta remains statistically positive ( , t-statistic = 146.19) in the 
presence of AQfactor, but its magnitude is reduced by 20% relative to the point estimate of 1.04 from the 
regression excluding AQfactor.  While this result suggests that some of the information in AQfactor
overlaps with the market risk premium, the statistical significance of both variables indicates that neither 
beta nor accruals quality subsumes the other.  Evidence on the extent to which AQfactor adds to 
explaining returns is provided in the last row of Panel A, where we report the incremental explanatory
power of the AQfactor, equal to the average difference in adjusted R
2s from estimations of equation (5) 
versus equation (4).  These results show that AQfactor increases the average adjusted R
2 by 4.3% from a 
mean of 13.5% to a mean of 17.8%, or by about 32%.
ˆ 0.83 E  
We also investigate the ability of AQfactor to explain returns by examining its contribution to the 
three-factor asset pricing model.  This analysis provides evidence on whether AQfactor proxies for either 
21or both the size factor (SMB) or the book-to-market factor (HML), both of which have been shown to be 
incrementally relevant for asset pricing (Fama and French [1993]). We begin by estimating the three-
factor model for each of the J=8,881 firms:
m j m j m j m F m M j j m F m j HML h SMB s R R b a R R , , , , , ) ( H         (6)
Panel A reports the mean coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the three-factor pricing 
regressions.  These results show that each of the factor loadings is highly significant, with t-statistics of 
164.71 (b), 106.35 (s) and 23.53 (h).  Together, the three factors explain an average of 18.9% of the total 
variation in the sample firms’ excess returns. The remaining columns of Panel A report the mean 
coefficient estimates and t-statistics for regressions which include AQfactor:
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The results show a mean estimate of  , with a t-statistic of 44.72.  Inspection of the incremental R
2’s
and the changes in the estimates of b, s and h, indicates that the significance of AQfactor comes both from
additional explanatory power (the average adjusted R
2 increases from a mean of 18.9% to a mean of 
20.8%) and from overlap with the other three factors. By far, the most significant overlap of is
with SMB, where the inclusion of AQfactor causes the average factor loading on SMB (s) to decline by
29%, from 0.90 to 0.64.  The significant impact of AQfactor on s is consistent with Berk’s [1995]
conclusion that size factor loadings reflect misspecification and estimation errors of the asset pricing 
model.  In particular, if the three-factor model is misspecified due to the exclusion of AQfactor, we would 
expect its inclusion to reduce the magnitude of the loading on SMB.
0 e !
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The results in Table 3 suggest that accruals quality plays a statistically and economically
meaningful role in determining the cost of equity capital.  To mitigate concerns that these findings are 
specific to the sample of firms used to calculate AQfactor, we repeat the one-factor and three-factor tests 
using the 20,878 publicly traded firms with at least 18 monthly returns during the period April 1971
22through March 2002.
8  If firms with poor accruals quality have higher costs of capital, their excess returns 
should exhibit positive loadings on AQfactor.  The results of these tests, reported in Panel B, Table 3, are, 
if anything, stronger than those reported in Panel A of this table.  In particular, the CAPM tests show 
significant positive loadings on AQfactor (t-statistic = 100.51), with AQfactor contributing a mean
incremental explanatory power of 4.1%, an increase of about 34% from the regression excluding
AQfactor.  The three-factor results show that AQfactor retains statistical significance in the presence of 
the other three factors (t-statistic = 53.02), and provides average incremental explanatory power of 2.1%, 
an increase of about 12% over the model excluding   In addition, the factor loading on SMB
decreases by 31% (from 0.83 to an average of 0.58) when  is included. 
. AQfactor
AQfactor
We interpret the results in Tables 2 and 3 as showing that accruals quality affects market
perceptions of equity risk.  The result that firms with poor quality accruals have larger costs of equity
capital than firms with high quality accruals is consistent both with intuition and with predictions from
Easley and O’Hara [2003], O’Hara [2003] and Leuz and Verrecchia [2004].  Furthermore, the loadings on 
the other variables change, sometimes substantially, when the accruals quality factor is added to the asset 
pricing model.  Such coefficient changes indicate that an asset pricing model without an information
quality factor is not fully specified (inducing misspecification bias on the coefficients); in particular, mere
correlation between AQfactor and the other factors would not substantially change coefficient estimates.
5. The Pricing of Innate versus Discretionary Accruals Quality 
The results in Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that total accruals quality is priced by the market.  In 
this section we test Hypothesis 2, which considers differential pricing effects for the innate versus 
discretionary components of accruals quality.  Our tests use the two approaches described in section 2.3.2 
to distinguish the innate and discretionary components of accruals quality.
8 This analysis is facilitated by the factor mimicking portfolio design which maps firm- and year-specific accruals 
quality values into month-specific excess returns, AQfactor.  Because AQfactor is not firm-specific, it can be
correlated with the excess returns of any firm, irrespective of whether the firm has data to calculate AQ.
23Our perspective on the relation between accruals quality and costs of capital is that both the 
innate component and the discretionary component of accruals quality have the potential to influence
costs of capital.  In related work, Cohen [2003] explores whether a set of nine exogenous variables
explains both reporting quality and its economic consequences.
 9  He uses a two-stage regression
approach, in which he first estimates the probability that reporting quality for a given firm is above the 
industry median and then tests for an association between this instrument for reporting quality and proxies
for economic consequences.  He finds reporting quality is associated with bid-ask spreads and analyst
forecast dispersion, but not with his implied estimates of the cost of equity capital.  While our sample
period, data, variable selection and measurement, and research design differ considerably from his, both
studies identify firm-specific variables that are intended to capture intrinsic influences on reporting 
outcomes.
5.1.  Separating accruals quality into innate and discretionary components (Method 1)
DD identify five innate factors as affecting accruals quality: firm size (Size, measured as the log 
of total assets; our results are not sensitive to other measures of size, such as revenues), standard deviation 
of cash flow from operations ( ( ) CFO V ), standard deviation of sales revenues ( ( ) Sales V ), length of 
operating cycle ( , measured as the sum of days accounts receivable and days inventory) and 
incidence of negative earnings realizations (
OperCycle
NegEarn).  Following DD, we expect smaller firms, and 
firms with greater cash flow volatility, longer operating cycles, and a greater incidence of losses, to have 
poorer accruals quality.  We measure each of these summary indicators on a firm-specific basis, using 
rolling 10-year windows (we require at least five observations in each window); results are not sensitive 
to the length of the window used to measure the innate factors.  Descriptive statistics about the innate 
factors are reported in Table 1.  The values of the indicators for our sample (1970-2001) are similar to 
those reported by DD for their sample (1987-1999). For example, our sample mean values are 4.80 for
9 Of the nine exogenous variables, two (firm size and operating cycle) are also included in the DD set.  The other
seven variables are number of shareholders, growth in sales, capital intensity, market share, leverage, gross margin
percentage, and number of business segments, all industry-adjusted.
24Size, 0.094 for ( ) CFO V , 0.257 for ( ) Sales V , 182 days for O , and 19.3% for  perCycle NegEarn; in 
comparison, Dechow and Dichev report mean values of 5.50 for Size, 0.060 for ( ) CFO V , 0.215 for 
(Sales) V , 141 days for , and 10% for  OperCycle . NegEarn
Our first approach to identifying the components of accruals quality (Method 1) relies on annual 
estimations of equation (8):
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where , ( jt CFO V = the standard deviation of firm j’s CFO, calculated over the past 10 years,
t j Sales , ) ( V = the standard deviation of firm j’s sales, calculated over the past 10 years,
t j OperCycle , = the log of firm j’s operating cycle,
, jt NegEarn = the number of years, out of the past 10, where firm j reported NIBE<0.
The predicted values from (8) yield an estimate of the innate portion of firm j’s accrual quality in year t, 
,0 1,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ () () , j tj tj t j t j t InnateAQ Size CFO Sales OperC jt ycle NegEarn OO O V O V O O       .  The residual 
from (8) is the estimate of the discretionary component of firm j’s accrual quality, ,, ˆ j tj DiscAQ t P   .
Table 4, panel A reports the mean coefficient estimates from the annual regressions of equation
(8).  The reported t-statistics are based on the time-series standard errors of the 32 coefficient estimates.
In all cases, we find the expected signs on the summary indicators of innate factors (i.e., all indicators but 
Size are positively related to accruals quality, Size is negatively related), and all indicators are individually
significant in explaining accruals quality (with t-statistics, in absolute value, ranging from 12.38 to 
24.38).  The explanatory power of the summary indicators of innate factors  averages 45% across the 
yearly estimations.
Using the parameter estimates obtained from the annual regressions of (8), we calculate 
 and InnateAQ DiscAQ derived using Method 1.  Unreported results show that the mean (median) value 
of the innate component is 0.044 (0.037), compared to a zero mean (-0.003 median) value for the
discretionary component. The zero mean value of DiscAQ is expected, given that the discretionary
component is defined as the prediction error from (8).  Because AQ is linear in accrual quality (with larger 
25values of AQ indicating poorer quality accruals), DiscAQ and InnateAQ are also linear in accruals quality.
Hence, the negative median value of DiscAQ indicates that for the median firm, the discretionary
component of accruals quality increases accruals quality.  In unreported tests, we find that DiscAQ is 
negative for 58% of the observations; this percentage is reliably different from chance (50%) at the 0.001 
level.  On the whole, we believe these data are consistent both with Guay, Kothari and Watts’ [1996]
view and Subramanyam’s [1996] evidence – that the expected net effect of discretion over accruals
quality in broad samples that approximate the population will be to improve earnings as a performance
measure – and with Healy’s [1996] comment that panel data are likely to be heterogeneous with respect to 
how managers exercise their discretion over accruals. 
As a validity test of Method 1’s decomposition of total accruals quality into InnateAQ and 
DiscAQ, we investigate over time changes in each of these components.  We expect that firms with poor 
quality that is driven by innate features of the business environment would find it more difficult to 
improve their situation than would firms where poor quality is driven by discretionary sources.  We test 
this conjecture by examining the percentage year-to-year absolute change in InnateAQ and DiscAQ,
holding the firm constant.  Using a paired-sample test of these changes, we find that the average change in 
DiscAQ is significantly (at the 0.001 level) larger than the average change in InnateAQ.  Specifically, the 
average change is 160 percentage points larger for discretionary than for innate (t-statistic = 105).  These 
results are insensitive to whether we use raw rather than percentage change values (t-statistic is 151 for
raw values). Overall, we view these results as supportive of Method 1’s identification of the innate-
discretionary partition. 
5.2.  Cost of capital effects of innate and discretionary accruals quality
Our first approach to distinguishing between the cost of capital effects of innate and discretionary
accruals quality substitutes InnateAQ and DiscAQ for AQ in the original cost of capital regressions.  Our 
second approach adds the summary indicators of innate factors as right hand side variables to the original 
cost of capital regressions.  In both approaches, and for each cost of capital test, we continue to control for 
variables found by prior research to be associated with the cost of capital.  Table 4 reports the results of 
26estimating the main regression tests for the cost of debt (Panel B), industry-adjusted earnings-price ratios 
(Panel C), and firm-specific, three-factor, asset pricing regressions for all listed firms (Panel D).  For 
brevity, we do not table the coefficient estimates on the summary indicators of innate factors under the 
second approach.
Turning first to the cost of debt tests, Panel B shows that under Method 2, the discretionary
component of accruals quality has a significant pricing effect.  Specifically, the decile rank regressions 
show a mean coefficient estimate on AQ of 0.08 (t-statistic = 9.93). This result suggests that firms with 
the best discretionary accruals quality enjoy 72 bp lower costs of debt than firms with the worst 
discretionary accruals quality.
10  Comparing these results with those for the total accruals quality metrics 
(reported in the columns labeled “Total”; these are identical to the results in Panel B, Table 2) shows that 
the cost of debt effects of discretionary accruals quality are about one-half of the total effects documented
previously (0.08 versus 0.14).   Since total AQ reflects both innate and discretionary effects, we interpret 
these results as not consistent with the null hypothesis of no difference in the pricing effects of innate 
versus discretionary accruals quality; rather, the results indicate that discretionary accruals quality has a 
weaker pricing effect than innate accruals quality.
The cost of debt effects of discretionary accruals quality are both smaller in magnitude and 
weaker in statistical significance under Method 1, which explicitly separates the innate component of
accruals quality and therefore allows for direct comparisons.  The mean coefficient estimate on InnateAQ
is over six times as large as the mean coefficient on DiscAQ (i.e., 0.26 versus 0.04).  Both are reliably
different from zero (the t-statistic of InnateAQ is 13.11 and the t-statistic for DiscAQ is 6.92).
Economically, the effect of innate accruals quality is to increase the cost of debt by about 234 bp between 
the highest and lowest innate accruals quality firms, while the effect of discretionary accruals quality is 
about 36 bp. The difference in innate versus discretionary pricing effects is significant at the 0.001 level 
10  To maintain notational consistency with how we describe AQ in the rest of the paper, we continue to use the
naming convention “best” (“worst”) to describe the lowest (highest) values of AQ when discussing discretionary
AQ.  This does not indicate any priors on our part. As discussed previously, to the extent the performance
subcomponent of discretionary accruals dominates, higher values of discretionary accruals can be associated with 
lower information asymmetry.
27(tests not reported).  These results indicate that investors attach a higher cost of debt to firms with poor
accruals quality that is attributable to innate factors, relative to the cost of debt effects of discretionary
accruals quality.
Tests based on industry-adjusted earnings-price ratios as the measure of cost of equity capital 
(Panel C) lead to similar inferences.  Under Method 2, discretionary accruals quality has a positive 
coefficient that is smaller and less significant (estimate is 0.0008, with a t-statistic = 4.77) than is the 
coefficient on total accruals quality (estimate is 0.0013, t-statistic = 5.83).  When both innate and 
discretionary components are included (Method 1), the coefficient on the innate component exceeds the 
coefficient on the discretionary component by a factor of four (0.0021 versus 0.0005, difference (not 
reported) significant at the 0.001 level). The t-statistic for the mean coefficient on the innate component
equals 6.97, while the mean coefficient on the discretionary component exhibits weaker statistical
significance (t-statistic = 3.00).  Similar to the results in Panel B, the Panel C results reject the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the costs of capital effects of innate versus discretionary accruals
quality, in favor of the view that the innate component of accruals quality is accorded a higher risk
premium than is the discretionary component.
Results of firm-specific asset pricing regressions are reported in Panel D.  For Method 2, we 
construct factor-mimicking portfolios for each innate factor, which we add to equation (7) as additional 
independent variables.  For Method 1, we construct factor-mimicking portfolios for InnateAQ and 
DiscAQ, which we substitute for  in equation (7).  We estimate these augmented equations for 
the 20,878 firms with at least 18 monthly returns.  We obtain similar results (not reported) if we restrict 
the analysis to 8,881 firms with data on the AQ variables, or if we use the CAPM as the base model.  Both 
methods of distinguishing DiscAQ produce reliably (at the 0.001 level) positive loadings on the accrual 
quality factors: under Method 1, the coefficient estimate on innate AQfactor is 0.23 (t-statistic = 52.20) 
and the coefficient estimate on discretionary AQfactor is 0.10 (t-statistic = 8.94); under Method 2, the 
discretionary component has a mean factor loading of 0.09 (t-statistic = 3.98).  For both methods, the 
coefficient on discretionary AQfactor is reliably smaller (at the 0.001 level, not reported) than the
AQfactor
28respective coefficient estimate on total or on innate AQfactor.  Although it is not straightforward
to interpret differences in factor loadings on the innate and discretionary components under Method 1 
(because the factor itself changes), we observe that the loading on discretionary AQ is about one-half the 
loading on innate AQ; this difference is significant at the 0.001 level (not reported).
AQfactor
5.3. Summary
We draw the following inferences from the results in Table 4.  Summary indicators (size, 
standard deviation of cash flows, standard deviation of sales revenues, operating cycle, and frequency of 
negative earnings) of innate operating and environmental factors explain a significant portion of accruals 
quality.  We interpret this result as indicating that a substantial portion of total accruals quality is innate, 
in the sense that it is attributable to business models and operating environments, as opposed to
discretionary (attributable to accounting policy choice, implementation decisions, and estimation errors).
We also find that a larger-than-chance fraction of firms have negative values of our discretionary accruals 
measures; this pattern is consistent with Guay, Kothari and Watts’ view that, in broad samples over long 
time periods, managers will tend to use accruals to improve earnings as a performance signal.  Finally, we 
find that innate accruals quality is reliably priced (over and above cost of capital determinants identified
by prior research) and that the discretionary component of accruals quality has significantly smaller 
pricing effects.  This result is inconsistent with the view that the source of information risk is a matter of 
indifference to investors; rather, our results suggest that the information uncertainty measured by innate
accruals quality has stronger cost of capital consequences than does the discretionary component.  We 
speculate that this result is at least partly due to the commingling of discretionary accruals quality effects 
that are opportunistic (hence, information-risk-increasing) and discretionary accruals effects that reflect 
management’s attempts to make earnings more informative (hence, information-risk-decreasing);
disentangling these effects would require a different sample and different research design than the one we 
use.
296. Additional Tests 
In this section, we summarize the results of several sensitivity tests (section 6.1), and we describe 
two supplemental tests. The first supplemental test investigates whether changes in accruals quality are 
predictably associated with changes in the proxies for costs of capital (section 6.2); the second examines
the relation between our findings and the accruals anomaly (section 6.3). 
6.1. Sensitivity tests
We examine the sensitivity of our results to several methodological choices or concerns: 
estimation procedures, variable specification, skewness, and alternative proxies for accruals quality.  With 
respect to estimation procedure, we repeat our tests using pooled time-series, cross-sectional regressions.
For these tests, we control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation by assessing statistical inference 
using Newey-West [1987] standard errors.  The pooled results (not reported) are similar in all respects to 
the annual results.  With respect to variable specification, we repeat our tests replacing the decile rank 
values of AQ with the raw values of this variable.  Results for the raw regressions (not reported) are 
similar in all respects to those reported.  With respect to skewness, we investigate whether the results are 
robust to the exclusion of firms in the worst accruals quality quintile.  Although the magnitude of the cost 
of capital effects are smaller when we exclude observations in Q5 (not reported), all results and 
differences remain statistically significant.  Finally, with respect to alternative proxies, we repeat our tests 
using four other proxies for accruals quality (the calculations of these proxies are detailed in the 
Appendix). While the results for proxies based on the absolute value of abnormal accruals generally
show smaller cost of capital effects than do proxies based on the standard deviation of residuals (not 
reported), all results and differences are statistically significant. 
6.2.  Changes in accruals quality and changes in costs of capital
To augment the cross-sectional tests of total accruals quality detailed in section 4, we investigate 
whether the change in a firm’s accruals quality is positively correlated with the change in its costs of 
capital.  While this test controls for firm-specific factors that are constant over time, it has lower power 
(relative to the cross-sectional levels tests) because of the over-time variation in AQ.  We first divide the 
30sample period into six intervals, T=1,2,…6, corresponding to the following sub-periods: 1970-75, 1976-
80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, and 1996-2001.  For each sub-period, we calculate firm j’s mean value of 
AQ (we require at least three observations to calculate the mean; results are not sensitive to this choice).
We then take the difference in firm j’s mean value of AQ between T and T-2; we exclude T-1 from the 
comparison to avoid overlap with the interval used to calculate AQ.  We also calculate the mean change in 
each of firm j’s cost of capital proxies between T and T-2:  j CostDebt ' , j IndEP '  and  j Beta ' .  Because
these tests require data for both period T and period T-2, the number of observations is smaller than in the
previous tests:   (n=3,193),  j CostDebt ' j IndEP ' (n=2,920) and j Beta '  (n=3,698). 
Our tests regress the change in each cost of capital measure on the change in AQ.  The results 
show significant positive correlations for all cost of capital measures: t-statistics are 2.33 for  j Beta ' , 4.35
for , and 5.65 for .  We conclude from these results that the cross-sectional finding – 
that accruals quality is priced by the market – is robust to an alternative research design which holds the 
firm constant and correlates over-time changes in accruals quality with contemporaneous changes in costs 
of capital. 
j IndEP ' j CostDebt '
6.3.  Comparison with Sloan [1996]
Our final analysis of the pricing of total accruals quality explores the relation between our 
findings and those documented in Sloan [1996] concerning the accruals anomaly.  Our beta regressions 
(Table 2, panel A) are similar in appearance to some of the accruals anomaly tests in Sloan [1996, Table 
6].  Specifically, we sort firms into quintiles based on accruals quality and regress quintile returns on 
excess market returns; Sloan sorts firms into deciles based on signed total accruals and regresses signed-
accrual decile returns on excess market returns.   However, we believe that Sloan’s tests and ours are 
substantively unrelated.  First, Sloan’s interest is in the regression intercept (“Jensen’s alpha”), a measure
of the unexpected return.  In contrast, our interest is in the slope coefficient (“beta”), a measure of the 
expected return, i.e., the cost of capital.  Second, the accrual quality effects we document are predicated
on over-time variability of accrual mappings into cash flows, or, in the sensitivity checks reported in 
31section 6.1, on absolute abnormal accruals.  Neither of these constructs maps directly into the signed 
accruals or signed abnormal accruals which are the basis for accruals anomaly. Further, even if such a 
mapping existed, our asset pricing results are robust to controls for size and book-to-market factors, 
which Fama and French [1996] show capture value-glamour strategies, such as cash flow-to-price, which 
in turn has been shown by Desai, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam [2003] to capture most or all of the 
accruals anomaly.
To test whether our results are empirically related to Sloan’s results, we perform portfolio tests 
similar to his.  Specifically, we go long in the top decile of total accruals and short in the bottom total 
accruals decile.  We then test to see whether the intercept (the measure of the accruals anomaly) of this 
total accruals ‘hedge’ portfolio is eliminated when we add AQfactor to the model of expected return 
(similar to equation (7), except the dependent variable is the return to the accruals hedge portfolio).  The 
results (not reported) show that the intercept is only marginally affected.  We conclude that our results are 
largely unrelated to the accruals anomaly.
7. Conclusions
We find that investors price securities in a manner that reflects their awareness of accruals
quality: lower quality accruals are associated with higher costs of debt, smaller price multiples on 
earnings, and larger equity betas.  Moreover, accruals quality loads as a separate factor in explaining 
variation in excess returns in both one-factor and three-factor asset pricing regressions.  Our results are 
consistent across securities (debt and common equity), estimation procedures (pooled regressions and 
annual regressions), variable specification (raw and decile), research design (cross-sectional levels versus 
over-time changes), and proxies for accruals quality (standard deviation of residuals from Dechow-
Dichev type models and absolute values of abnormal accruals), and are robust to the inclusion of control
variables known to affect costs of capital. 
We also assess the separate costs of capital effects of the innate and discretionary components of
accruals quality.  Using two distinct approaches to isolate the discretionary portion of accruals quality, we 
32reject the hypothesis that discretionary accruals quality and innate accruals quality have indistinguishable 
costs of capital effects, in favor of the view that the discretionary component of accruals quality, on 
average, has a significantly smaller pricing effect than the innate component of accruals quality.  The 
latter result, when interpreted in the context of our broad samples, is consistent with heterogeneity among
firms with respect to discretionary accruals (Guay, Kothari and Watts [1996], Subramanyam [1996]).
While many managers use discretionary accruals to improve the reporting of the underlying economics
(decreasing information uncertainty), previous research on earnings management has also documented
how managers, in some time periods, make accounting choices and implementation decisions that reduce
accruals quality (increasing information uncertainty). We do not attempt to segment our sample along 
lines that would allow us to explore the firm- and time-specific operation of specific incentives to engage 
in accruals-quality-decreasing behaviors.  For example, managers compensated with stock options have 
incentives to increase volatility during the expected lives of their options, so as to increase the options’
value.  Since the firm’s cost of capital can be viewed as a proxy for the volatility of returns, the existence 
of stock options provides an incentive for managers to take actions which increase the cost of capital, 
even though such increases impose costs on the firm.
Finally, our broad-sample evidence supports the view that the capital market consequences of 
differences in accruals quality arise because accruals quality proxies for information risk, a risk factor that 
cannot be diversified away in equilibrium (Easley and O’Hara [2003]; O’Hara [2003]; Leuz and 
Verrecchia [2004]).  In contrast to other firm characteristics that have been shown by prior research to 
empirically predict cross-sectional differences in costs of capital, notably size and the book-to-market
ratio, accruals quality maps into a theoretically grounded cost of capital determinant: information risk. 
33Appendix: Alternative Proxies for Accruals Quality 
In addition to , () j t AQ jt VX   , we considered four other proxies for accruals quality, two based on 
the standard deviation of residuals from Dechow-Dichev regressions, and two based on measures of 
absolute abnormal accruals.  In this Appendix, we detail our calculations of these four proxies.
The first additional  proxy is the standard deviation of residuals from an (unmodified) Dechow-
Dichev model estimated annually for each of Fama and French’s [1997] 48 industry groups with at least 
20 firms in year t.  The model regresses total current accruals in year t on lagged, current, and future cash 
flows from operations (this unmodified regression excludes the change in revenues and PPE as
independent variables).  Accruals quality is captured by the standard deviation of firm j’s annual residuals 
from these regressions,  , j t X , calculated over years t-4 through t,  . , ()
Unmodified
jt j t AQ VX  
Our second additional accruals quality metric is based on firm-specific time-series estimations of 
the (unmodified) Dechow-Dichev model.  For each firm j and year t, we estimate the relation between 
current accruals and past, current and future cash flows using the most recent 12 years of data; this 
estimation yields 10 values of the residual for each firm. , ()
Firm Specific
jt j t AQ VX
    is the standard deviation
of the resulting 10 firm-specific residuals. 
Our third additional metric is the absolute value of abnormal accruals generated by the modified
Jones (1991) approach.  We estimate the following cross-sectional regression for each of the Fama-
French 48 industry groups with at least 20 firms in year t. 
,
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The industry- and year-specific parameter estimates obtained from equation (A1) are used to estimate
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  NA .  The absolute value of the resulting measure of abnormal accruals is our third
additional proxy for accruals quality, ,, j t AQ AA   jt , with larger values of  , j t AA  indicating poorer
accruals quality.
To obtain our fourth additional accruals quality metric, we extend the modified Jones abnormal
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We include the change in accounts receivable in the estimation of normal accruals because not doing so 
produces abnormal accruals values which are not centered on zero when the mean  is not zero.  In 
particular, the mean   will be positive for firms that are growing; a positive 
AR '
AR ' AR '  implies that normal
accruals will be under-stated by the modified Jones approach, leading to positive mean AA’s. The
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  NA .  The second extension adjusts the resulting abnormal accruals by
performance-matching (Kothari, Leone and Wasley [2004]; McNichols [2000]).  Specifically, we
partition the sample firms in each industry into deciles based on the firm’s prior year return on assets 
(ROA) defined as net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning of year total assets.
Performance-adjusted accruals are calculated as the difference between firm j’s metric and the median
metric for its industry ROA decile, where the median calculation excludes firm j. Our fourth additional 







Summary Financial Information About the Sample Firms, 1970-2001
Variable mean 10% 25% median 75% 90%
AQ 0.0442 0.0107 0.0179 0.0313 0.0558 0.0943
Financial variables:
Market value of equity ($mils) 1206.6 4.7 14.3 64.2 374.8 1702.1
Assets ($mils) 1283.5 8.5 25.6 102.0 511.3 2333.6
Sales ($mils) 1240.1 8.9 30.7 127.6 575.2 2297.8
ROA 0.003 -0.101 0.005 0.042 0.076 0.114
Market to book ratio 2.02 0.44 0.77 1.32 2.29 4.07
CostDebt 0.099 0.059 0.074 0.092 0.114 0.144
Leverage 0.276 0.010 0.109 0.248 0.381 0.520
V1,%( 0.065 0.011 0.020 0.038 0.077 0.151
Earnings-price ratio 0.089 0.026 0.047 0.073 0.114 0.166
IndEP 0.008 -0.045 -0.022 0.001 0.027 0.062
Sales growth 0.193 0.018 0.067 0.126 0.220 0.403
Growth (in book value of equity) 1.056 0.657 0.805 0.961 1.198 1.586
Innate factors explaining accruals quality:
Size (log of total assets) 4.805 2.138 3.241 4.625 6.237 7.755
VCFO 0.094 0.029 0.045 0.073 0.118 0.181
VSales 0.257 0.068 0.118 0.199 0.326 0.507
OperCycle 182 48 78 123 180 251
log(OperCycle) 4.707 3.866 4.362 4.810 5.191 5.527
NegEarn 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.300 0.600
Sample description and variable definitions: The sample contains 91,280 firm-year observations over 
t=1970-2001 with Compustat data to calculate AQ in any year. AQ= standard deviation of firm j’s
residuals, from years t-4 to t from annual cross-sectional estimations of the modified Dechow-Dichev 
(2002) model. ROA = return on assets; CostDebt = interest expense in year t+1 divided by average 
interest bearing debt in years t and t+1; Leverage = total interest bearing debt to total assets;  ( ) NIBE V =
standard deviation of firm j’s net income before extraordinary items; IndEP = industry-adjusted EP ratio, 
equal to firm j’s earnings-price ratio less the median earnings-price ratio of its industry; sales growth = 
year-to-year percentage change in sales; Growth = log of 1 plus the percentage change in the book value 
of equity; ( ) CFO V = standard deviation of cash flow from operations;  ( ) Sales V = standard deviation of 
sales; OperCycle = firm j’s operating cycle; NegEarn = incidence of negative earnings over the past 10 
years.
36Table 2
Tests of the Association Between Accruals Quality and
Proxies for the Costs of Debt and Equity Capital, 1970-2001
Panel A: Mean values of cost of debt, industry-adjusted EP ratios, and beta by AQ quintiles
a
AQ Quintile (1=High AQ score; 5 Low AQ score) Q5-Q1
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Diff. t-stat.
CostDebt 8.98 9.49 9.71 10.08 10.77 1.79 10.10
IndEP 0.0048 0.0032 0.0076 0.0091 0.0140 0.0093 4.37
Beta 0.92 1.02 1.08 1.14 1.27 0.35 6.75
Panel B: Means of annual regressions of  cost of debt on accruals quality, with controls
b







Panel C: Means of annual regressions of industry-adjusted EP ratio on accruals quality, with controls
c






Sample description and variable definitions: See Table 1 for variable definitions. The sample used in the 
cost of debt tests (Panels A and B) contains 76,195 observations over 1970-2001.  The sample used in the
earnings-price ratio tests (Panels A and C) contains 55,092 firm-year observations over t=1970-2001.
The sample used to calculate betas consists of 8,881 firms with at least 18 monthly returns and data on 
AQ.
a The first two rows of Panel A show the mean cost of debt and mean industry-adjusted earnings-price 
ratio for each AQ quintile. The third row shows the portfolio beta for each AQ quintile, where Beta is 
calculated by regressing each quintile’s monthly excess return on the monthly excess market return, for 
the period April 1971 to March 2002.  The columns labeled “Q5-Q1” show the difference in the mean
values between the worst (Q5) and best (Q1) accruals quality quintiles, along with t-statistics of whether 
the difference is zero.
b Panel B (Panel C) reports the mean results of estimating annual relations between firm j’s cost of debt 
(industry-adjusted earnings-price ratio) and the decile rank value of AQ, controlling for other factors
known to affect the cost of debt (industry-adjusted earnings-price ratio).  T-statistics are based on the 
time-series standard errors of the 32 coefficient estimates.
37Table 3
Asset Pricing Tests of the Association Between
Future Stock Returns and Accruals Quality, 1971-2002
Panel A: Firm-specific cost-of-capital regressions (n=8,881 firms with AQ values and returns data)
a
Base model: CAPM Base model: 3-factor
coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat
R M-R F 1.04 174.57 0.83 146.19 0.95 164.71 0.90 154.48
SMB  - -  -  - 0.90 106.35 0.64 69.59
HML  - -  -  - 0.21 23.53 0.30 34.42
AQfactor  - - 0.47 83.48  -  - 0.28 44.72
Adj. R
2 0.135 0.178 0.189 0.208
Inc R
2 0.043  0.019
Panel B: Firm-specific cost-of-capital regressions (n=20,878 firms with returns data)
b
Base model: CAPM Base model: 3-factor
coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat
R M-R F 0.99 178.24 0.77 147.33 0.91 162.08 0.86 150.77
SMB  - -  -  - 0.83 108.00 0.58 63.40
HML  - -  -  - 0.21 24.22 0.32 36.24
AQfactor  - - 0.46 100.51  -  - 0.29 53.02
Adj. R
2 0.120 0.161 0.173 0.195
Inc R
2 0.041  0.021
Sample description and variable definitions: The sample used in Panel A consists of 8,881 firms with data 
on AQ and with at least 18 monthly stock returns between April 1971 and March 2002.  The sample used 
in Panel B consists of 20,878 firms with at least 18 monthly stock returns between April 1971 and March 
2002.  Variable definitions: MF RR   = excess return on the market portfolio; SMB = return to size factor-
mimicking portfolio; HML = return to book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio; AQfactor = the return 
to the accruals quality factor-mimicking portfolio for AQ.
a Panel A reports the average coefficient estimates across the J=8,881 firm-specific estimations of the 
one-factor and 3-factor asset pricing models.  For each of these base models, we also report coefficient 
estimates for regressions which include . AQfactor
b Panel B reports similar information as Panel A, except these results are based on the J=20,878 firms
with at least 18 monthly returns
38Table 4
Tests of the Cost of Capital Effects of the Innate and Discretionary
Components of Accruals Quality, 1970-2001










Panel B: Mean results of annual regressions of  cost of debt on accruals quality, with controls
b
Total Method 1 Method 2
Indep. var. coef.est. t-stat coef.est. t-stat coef.est. t-stat
Leverage -2.50 -9.76 -2.64 -9.83 -2.87 -11.67
Size -0.01 -0.55 0.11 4.15 0.04 1.73
ROA -1.65 -5.02 -1.73 -5.34 -1.52 -4.89
IntCov -0.02 -5.24 -0.02 -5.06 -0.01 -4.54
V1,%( 5.44 12.35 1.10 1.62 -1.68 -2.87
AQ Total 0.14 13.36 -- -- -- --
Method 1: Innate -- -- 0.26 13.11 -- --
Disc -- -- 0.04 6.92 -- --
Method 2: Disc -- -- -- -- 0.08 9.93
Panel C: Mean results of annual regressions of industry-adjusted EP ratios on accruals quality, with controls
c
Total Method 1 Method 2
Indep. var. coef.est. t-stat coef.est. t-stat coef.est. t-stat
Growth -0.0027 -2.00 -0.0032 -2.26 -0.0046 -3.53
Beta -0.0043 -2.74 -0.0056 -3.85 -0.0047 -3.25
Leverage 0.0097 2.55 0.0077 2.06 0.0088 2.23
Size -0.0009 -1.67 0.0005 0.86 -0.0004 -0.75
AQ Total 0.0013 5.83 -- -- -- --
Method 1: Innate -- -- 0.0021 6.97 -- --
Disc -- -- 0.0005 3.00 -- --
Method 2: Disc -- -- -- -- 0.0008 4.77
Panel D: Mean results of firm-specific cost-of-capital regressions, 3-factor model (n=20,878 firms)
d
Total Method 1 Method 2
coef.est. t-stat coef.est. t-stat coef.est. t-stat
R M-R F 0.86 150.77 0.88 148.84 0.89 107.18
SMB 0.58 63.40 0.59 63.62 0.58 53.24
HML 0.32 36.24 0.32 34.65 0.27 24.15
AQfactor Total 0.29 53.02 -- -- -- --
Method 1: Innate -- -- 0.23 52.20 -- --
Disc -- -- 0.10 8.94 -- --
Method 2: Disc -- -- -- -- 0.09 3.98
39Sample definition and variable definitions: Under Method 1, InnateAQ is the predicted values obtained 
from the annual parameter estimates and firm j’s reported values of the innate factors; DiscAQ is the 
residual. Under Method 2, DiscAQ is the coefficient on (total) AQ, including the innate factors as control 
variables. See Table 1 for other definitions.
a Panel A reports the mean values of the 32 annual coefficient estimates obtained from regressions of AQ
on the innate factors.  T-statistics are based on the standard errors of the 32 coefficient estimates.
b Panel B reports the mean results of estimating annual relations between firm j’s cost of debt and the 
decile rank value of AQ, controlling for other factors known to affect the cost of debt.  The columns
labeled “Total” show the results including (total) AQ in the regressions; these results are identical to those 
shown in Tables 2 and 3. The columns labeled “Method 1” show results where we substitute the 
estimates of the innate and discretionary components of accruals quality (InnateAQ and DiscAQ) for AQ
in the cost of debt regression.  The columns labeled “Method 2” shows results where we include the 
innate factors in the cost of debt regression. 
c Panel C reports similar information as Panel B, except that the focus is on the cost of equity, as proxied 
by industry-adjusted earnings-price ratios. 
d Panel D reports similar information as Panel B, except that the focus is on the cost of equity, as captured 
by factor loadings on AQfactor in regressions of realized returns on the market risk premium, SMB, HML
and AQfactor.  The sample used in Panel D consists of 20,878 firms with at least 18 monthly stock returns 
between April 1971 and March 2002.
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